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heterogeneity even after controlling for the impact of data and methods. We find that more 
open economies and countries with stronger unions tend to have less pro-cyclical (or more 
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1.  Introduction  
Empirical evidence about the direction and the extent of the response of aggregate real wages 
to business cycle fluctuations is inconclusive. In particular, the available results differ according to 
the data and methods that have been used. For example, in their survey of the literature, Abraham 
and Haltiwanger (1995) find that typical discrepancies across measures relate to differences in the 
data used, such as the wage measure, deflator, business cycle indicator, data frequency, sample 
period and sectors covered; and to methods, such as the precise measure of co-movement and the 
extent to which dynamics of real wages and output are taken into account. As a result, little is known 
about true cross-country variation in the adjustment of real wages over the business cycle and its 
potential determinants. 
We provide evidence of differences in the adjustment of aggregate real wages in the 
manufacturing sectors over the business cycle across a large sample of OECD countries covering a 
time period of more than 40 years, starting from the 1960s. Our paper contributes to the empirical 
knowledge about aggregate real wage cyclicality in several ways. First, we use cross-country data to 
evaluate qualitative conclusions emerging from survey evidence on real wage cyclicality. In 
particular, we analyze the importance of differences in data and methods in determining cross-
country differences in measured real wage cyclicality. We evaluate three dimensions that have been 
found to be important in previous literature: the deflators used to construct real wages, the measure 
of the business cycle and the methodology used to measure cyclicality.  
Second, we provide a first systematic cross-country evidence of real wage cyclicality using 
empirical approaches that properly take into account the dynamic nature of the aggregate time-series 
under consideration. Most studies in this literature have measured co-movement between real wages  
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and the cycle using a static approach.
1 However, a number of authors beginning with Neftci (1978) 
have stressed that accounting for the dynamic properties of the data series, such as persistence over 
time, may matter for correctly understanding real wage cyclicality.
2 The dynamic properties of the 
data can indeed vary substantially across data series and countries, and as shown in Den Haan (2000) 
evidence on cyclicality based on simple static measures can be misleading. Den Haan argues that the 
measured cyclicality of prices depends on whether co-movement is measured over the short or the 
long run. A priori, this dimension is potentially even more relevant for measuring real wage 
cyclicality, as nominal wage contracts tend to be fixed for an extended time period. When nominal 
wages are rigid in the short-term, measured cyclicality of real wages in the short run is likely to be 
dominated by changes in the deflator as adjustment through the wage-setting process becomes 
evident only with a lag. We use two dynamic approaches: the time domain approach proposed by 
Den Haan (2000) and the frequency domain approach proposed by Croux et al. (2001). In addition to 
properly taking into account the dynamics of the data series these methods also allow us to evaluate 
different business cycle horizons as an additional dimension that may result in variation across 
countries. Few studies have used these methods to study real wage cyclicality so far. The exception 
is the short note by Den Haan and Sumner (2002), where real wages appear pro-cyclical in the G7 
countries and more so at longer horizons. In a related paper Lamo et al. (2007) focus on the 
                                                 
1 The chosen cyclicality measure has been either the unconditional correlation coefficient between the cyclical 
component of real wages and an indicator of the cycle or the coefficient of OLS regressions of a (de-trended) real wage 
series on a (de-trended) business cycle series. In both cases, only the contemporaneous values of real wages and the cycle 
have been taken into account.  
2 Within this branch of literature, most contributions have adopted distributed lag or VAR models to focus on the 
dynamic response of real wages to business cycle indicators, or have used larger structural VAR models with identifying 
restrictions to study the reaction of real wages to different types of shocks. A review of the available empirical literature 
on aggregate real wage cyclicality can be found in Messina et al. (2006).  
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cyclicality of consumption, compensation and employment in the public sector. Camacho et al. 
(2006) apply the methods used here to measure business cycle co-movement in European countries.  
Finally, we show that a measure of real wage cyclicality that is clean of systematic 
differences in data and methods differs across countries in a meaningful way. Cross-country results 
of real wage cyclicality in European countries based on static correlation analysis of detrended series 
can also be found in Christodoulakis et al. (1995). We extend these cross-country analyses by using 
dynamic methods, measuring the impact of different data and methods, and documenting country 
heterogeneity after controlling for these differences.  
Our study does not address two potentially important factors that could lead to cross-country 
differences in the adjustment of real wages over the business cycle: the composition of shocks and 
changes in the composition of the labour force. First, the adjustment of real wages over the business 
cycle is likely to depend on the nature of the shock, with supply shocks leading to predominantly 
pro-cyclical and demand shocks leading to counter-cyclical responses. We cannot exclude that the 
measures of real wage cyclicality across countries that we derive are affected by country specific 
shocks. However, as average real wage cyclicality is here measured over an extended time period, 
the impact of country specific shocks is likely to be less important. Instead, owing to institutional 
diversity, differences in real wage cyclicality across countries are more likely to reflect differences in 
the labour market response to common shocks. Our robustness analysis using two different 
subsamples supports this view. Second, following Solon et al. (1994) a number of studies based on 
micro data have found that changes in the composition of the labour force over the business cycle are 
important and may lead to lower (less pro-cyclical) aggregate estimates of real wage cyclicality. In 
addition, the extent of real wage adjustment may vary across other disaggregated dimensions, such as 
regions, firm type (e.g. firm size and ownership). The homogeneity of the manufacturing sector 
across countries along these dimensions is likely to mitigate the potential impact of composition 
effects on cross country comparisons of real wage cyclicality. Further, we argue that measuring real  
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wage cyclicality at the macroeconomic level remains important for understanding the aggregate 
business cycle facts. In the absence of micro data that are both sufficiently comparable across 
countries and cover long time periods, cross-country comparisons of real wage cyclicality are only 
possible using macroeconomic data. 
Our findings suggest that data and methods indeed matter for observed real wage cyclicality, 
thus confirming previous survey evidence. Among the several dimensions that we test, differences in 
the type of deflators used result in largest and most robust differences across measures. In particular, 
real wage cyclicality is significantly more negative (more countercyclical) when the wage measure is 
deflated using producer prices, as opposed to the other deflators. While the use of dynamic methods 
is likely to provide more accurate measures of real wage cyclicality than static measures, we find that 
whether co-movement is measured in the short or the long run is not an important determinant of 
differences in real wage cyclicality across countries. Furthermore, even after controlling for 
differences in data and methods, country differences in real wage cyclicality remain important. 
Summary measures and cluster analysis point clearly to grouping of the countries into three groups: 
countries with mainly pro-cyclical real wages, countries with mainly counter-cyclical real wages and 
countries with either a-cyclical real wages or with very different patterns of cyclicality across 
deflators. These results indicate a more complex grouping of countries than a basic categorisation of 
countries to Continental European, Anglo-Saxon and Nordic labour market types would suggest. In 
particular, more open economies tend to show counter-cyclical wages. Moreover, our evidence 
points to a positive correlation between the cyclicality of real wages and the cyclicality of 
employment, suggesting that policy complementarities may influence the adjustment of both 
quantities and prices in the labour market. An exploration of possible structural determinants points 
to few robust associations between real wage cyclicality and measures of labour and product market 
indicators.   
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe our dataset. In section 
3 we introduce the methodology we use in our empirical investigation.  In section 4 we present our 
evidence on real wage cyclicality and systematically evaluate the importance of different data and 
method dimensions on the results. In section 5 we discuss the summary measures of wage cyclicality 
obtained and relate them to measures of wage rigidity and employment cyclicality. Finally, we 
conclude in section 6.  
2.  Data  
Our sample consists of 18 OECD countries and includes eleven continental European 
economies (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, 
Spain and Sweden), six Anglo-Saxon countries (Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, UK and 
the US) and Japan. 
3  
  We focus on data for the manufacturing sector. This focus has both advantages and 
disadvantages. A key advantage is that given limitations of data on the services sector, our focus on 
manufacturing allows us to benefit from long, high frequency data series that are of good quality. An 
important disadvantage is that manufacturing is a small and declining part of the overall economy in 
most OECD countries, limiting the scope of our results. However, manufacturing production tends to 
vary more over the business cycle than services, and as a result the measures of real wage cyclicality 
we derive may represent upper bounds for the whole economy. For evidence using compensation per 
employee for the whole economy, see Messina et al. (2006). 
The variables we consider are: nominal wages/earnings in manufacturing, Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) deflator, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) deflator, Producer Price Index (PPI) deflator, 
manufacturing employment and industrial production. The data frequency is quarterly. Data are 
available, depending on country and indicator, at most from the 1960s and at least from the early 
                                                 
3 Data for Germany before unification has been constructed using growth rates for West Germany.  
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1980s to 2004 (see Table A1 in Appendix for details). All series have been seasonally adjusted 
following the X12 procedure. The source of the data is the OECD Main Economic Indicators 
database. Summary statistics point to substantial persistence over time and large variation in the 
dynamic properties of the data across countries. Table 1 shows the standard deviation and the first-
order autocorrelation of band-pass filtered series.
4 All series are highly persistent, as shown by the 
average (across countries) first-order autocorrelation, which is consistently above 0.9. Volatility of 
nominal wages, as measured by the average standard deviation is comparable to that of the price 
series, except for the more volatile PPI series. As a result, real wages deflated by PPI deflator appear 
almost twice as volatile as real wages derived using the GDP deflator or the CPI deflator. At the 
same time, the maximum standard deviation of nominal and real wage measures is nearly five times 
larger than the minimum, suggesting that there are substantial differences across countries. Focussing 
on the business cycle indicators, industrial production is on average more volatile than employment. 
As expected, these indicators of the business cycle tend to be more volatile than nominal or real 
wages (with exception of the PPI deflated real wage measure). 
3.  Empirical methodology 
We construct measures of real wage cyclicality that vary in four different dimensions: the 
deflator, the measure of the business cycle, the method, and the horizon at which co-movement is 
measured.                       
The three different deflators we consider are the CPI deflator, the GDP deflator and the PPI 
deflator. These deflators are distinct in terms of the concept that they measure. Roughly speaking, the 
PPI refers to the prices at the factory gate. As a result, the PPI is strongly influenced by the evolution 
of input prices such as raw materials, as well as the cost of capital and labour. The GDP deflator at 
market prices measures the price of domestic value-added (including indirect taxes) and is based on 
                                                 
4 We use the Baxter-King band-pass filter, with a frequency band of 1.5 years to 8 years per cycle.   
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national accounts data. By definition it refers to prices of a broader set of goods than just 
manufacturing products, including the prices of domestically produced private and public services. 
Finally the CPI is based on a representative basket of final consumption goods. This includes 
imported consumption goods. Beyond the precise definition of the price index in terms of goods 
covered, an important difference across the deflators thus refers to the extent that they reflect mark-
ups (prices over input costs) at different stages of production. In particular, compared to the PPI, the 
CPI is likely to be most influenced by the cyclical evolution of mark-ups at later stages of the 
production and distribution chains. Results in Table 1 suggest that the cyclical component of 
consumer price inflation is substantially less volatile (as measured by the standard deviation) and 
more persistent (as measured by first order autocorrelation) than the PPI. Furthermore, on average 
the standard deviation of the GDP deflator and the CPI is of the same magnitude as the standard 
deviation of nominal hourly wages (not shown).  
The two indicators of the business cycle we consider are industrial production and 
employment, as is standard in the literature on real wage cyclicality.  
The two methods we adopt are the time domain approach proposed by Den Haan (2000) and 
the frequency domain approach proposed by Croux et al. (2001).
5 The time domain measure 
proposed by Den Haan (2000) is based on the degree of co-movement between VAR forecast errors 
at different horizons. This approach takes into account the dynamic nature of the macroeconomic 
data series under consideration through the inclusion of lagged variables in the VAR. Furthermore, 
the methodology can accommodate both stationary and non-stationary variables and thus does not 
require additional filtering. Den Haan considers a two variable VAR model in standard form: 
                                                 
5 To derive the time domain estimates we rely on the Matlab codes available at Wouter Den Haan’s homepage 
(http://weber.ucsd.edu/~wdenhaan/soft.html), while to derive the frequency domain estimates we use a version of the 
Matlab codes available at Mario Forni’s homepage (http://www.economia.unimore.it/forni_mario/matlab.htm), modified 
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where xt and yt are two random variables; A0 is a 2 × 1 vector of constant terms or a matrix of 
deterministic coefficients; Ai are 2 × 2 matrices of coefficients; v1t and v2t are two error terms which 
are assumed to be serially uncorrelated but that can be correlated with each other, and m is the total 
number of lags included in the model. After estimating the model it is straightforward to calculate 
the  k-period ahead forecasts errors for the two variables (see Den Haan, 2000 for a detailed 
description). In our empirical analysis, the Den Haan methodology is applied by estimating a number 
of bivariate VAR models where x and y refer to real wages and a measure of the business cycle. The 
VAR is estimated in terms of first log differences with the lag length and the deterministic 
components chosen by the Schwarz Information Criterion allowing for a maximum number of 8 lags. 
Bootstrapped standard errors based on 1000 replications were used to construct 90 percent 
confidence bands and standard errors. 
The measure proposed by Croux et al. (2001) is a correlation defined within the frequency 
domain. Consider two zero-mean real stochastic processes, x and y and let Sx(λ) and Sy(λ),-π ≤ λ ≤ -
π, be the spectral-density functions of x and y and Cxy(λ)  the co-spectrum. Then the dynamic 
correlation between x and y at frequency λ is given by:  








= λ ρ           ( 2 )  
This measure is a real number that takes values between -1 and 1 and allows computing the 
correlation between two series for each band of frequencies. Consistent with the time domain 
approach, dynamic correlations were calculated using data in first log differences. Following Croux 
et al. (2001), we applied a standard block bootstrap technique to construct 90 percent confidence 
bands and standard errors. The number of replications was set at 1000 and the length of the blocks 
was chosen to equal 12 quarters.  
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It should be noted that both the time domain and the frequency domain measures have a 
specific relationship with static unconditional correlation. In the case of the time domain, the 
correlation coefficient of the forecast errors of a bivariate VAR will converge to the static 
unconditional correlation coefficient of the two series as the forecast horizon goes to infinity. In the 
frequency domain case, the dynamic correlation between two processes over a frequency band is 
identical to the static correlation of the same processes after suitable pre-filtering (e.g. using the 
band-pass filter). For a given frequency interval [0, π], the static unconditional correlation is then the 
simple mean of the dynamic correlation over that interval.  
The measures of co-movement stemming from the time and frequency domain methods that 
we adopt improve upon static correlations derived from cyclical components of economic time series 
that have been filtered using standard methods. These methods include, within the time domain the 
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, and within the frequency domain, the Baxter-King (BK) bandpass filter. 
Both filters extract a business cycle component of the economic time series by removing low 
frequency trends (and for the BK band-pass filter also high frequency noise). Both standard methods 
present some problems. The HP filter is subject to an arbitrary choice of the smoothing parameter λ. 
The BK filter is only an approximation of the ideal band-pass filter since, like all moving-average 
smoothers, a number of observations at the beginning and the end of the sample are lost in its 
computation. More generally, alternative filters extract different types of information from the 
original series and, as a result, conclusions drawn from detrended data tend to vary widely across 
detrending methods (Canova, 1998). 
The dynamic methods we adopt overcome these disadvantages of the standard methods. In 
addition, within the time domain, the Den Haan method accommodates both stationary and non-
stationary processes and does not require identifying assumptions that are usually needed for VAR 
decompositions.  In addition, the use of dynamic methods allows us to add a further dimension to our 
measures of real wage cyclicality: the horizon at which co-movement is measured. This has been  
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shown to be a crucial element when evaluating co-movement of macroeconomic variables in 
different contexts (see Den Haan, 2000, Camacho et al., 2006 and Nath, 2004). The horizon could 
indeed matter for real wage cyclicality for a number of reasons. For example, as argued in the 
introduction, it is possible that the longer-term nature of nominal wage contracts allows wages to 
adjust to changes in business cycle conditions only with a significant lag.   
We consider three business cycle horizons. In the time domain method, we look at 1.5, 4 and 
8 year ahead forecast errors, while in the frequency domain method we look at the frequencies 
between 0 and π/3, 0 and π/8 and 0 and π/16 (corresponding to 1.5, 4 and 8 years periodicities in the 
time domain). We define these horizons as short, medium and long-run business cycle horizons. 
These horizons are in line with the findings of both the NBER and CEPR business cycle dating 
committees about the length of business cycles in the United States and the euro area respectively.
6 
As illustrative examples, the measures of co-movement and their 90% confidence bands are 
shown in Figures 1 and 2 for two countries in our sample: Spain and the United States. In both cases 
the measures are based on real wages deflated by the GDP deflator and IP as the business cycle 
indicator. The figures show that both dynamic methodologies are consistent and suggest that real 
wages are countercyclical in Spain and pro-cyclical in the United States. Interestingly, beyond the 
very first quarters, the horizon at which co-movement is measured does not appear to matter for the 
cyclicality of real wages in these two countries. In the time domain case, the short run correlation for 
Spain (United States) is -0.318 (0.521), the medium run correlation is -0.236 (0.515) and the long run 
correlation is -0.235 (0.503). In the frequency domain case, the short run correlation for Spain 
(United States) is -0.250 (0.472), the medium run correlation is -0.278 (0.491) and the long run 
correlation is -0.285 (0.495). We have checked that the limit of the time domain measure 
corresponds to the average of the frequency domain measure, confirming what theory predicts.  
                                                 
6 Details of these findings are available on the NBER and CEPR websites.  
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In sum, the variation across data and methods allows us to calculate altogether 36 different 
measures of real wage cyclicality for each of the 18 countries in our sample, resulting in a total of 
648 observations. The 36 different measures of correlation between real wages and the business 
cycle are derived calculating real wage cyclicality along the four dimensions we consider: deflator 
(3), measure of the business cycle (2), method (2), and business cycle horizon (3). 
4.  Real wage cyclicality across data, methods and countries 
In order to understand whether differences in data and methods are relevant in measuring real 
wage cyclicality, we first study kernel distributions of our real wage cyclicality measures along the 
four relevant dimensions. This first step is useful in determining simple patterns in our data without 
having to resort to parametric assumptions and/or specific assumptions about the type of relationship 
between different ways of measuring real wage cyclicality (e.g. linearity). 
Before analysing our correlation measures we transform them using the Fisher 
transformation. This transformation removes the constraint that the correlation coefficient has to lie 
between -1 and 1, thus bringing the distributions of correlation coefficients closer to the normal 













=            ( 3 )  
where r is the correlation coefficient. The transformed variable z is used in the analysis. 
The distributions of our Fisher transformed correlation measures are shown in Figure 3. We 
use Gaussian kernels to smooth the histograms, choosing the optimal bandwidth that minimises the 
asymptotic mean integrated squared error.  
These results show that the deflator used to construct the measures of real wage matters. 
There seems to be a clear ranking between the three deflators used: wages deflated by the PPI are  
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most counter-cyclical and CPI deflated wages are most pro-cyclical. Correlations derived from GDP 
deflated wages lie between these two and are centred around zero. These differences in the 
distributions are confirmed by a Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test of equality of distributions. The KS 
test of equality of PPI and GDP deflated wages yields a value of 0.254 (with a p-value less than 
0.01), while the same test contrasting GDP and CPI deflated wages also rejects the null of equality of 
distributions (value: 0.4074; p-value less than 0.01). This finding confirms and extends previous 
evidence summarised in Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995). The differences in the cyclicality of real 
producer (PPI deflated) and consumer (CPI deflated) wages thus points to a possible role for 
imperfections in the goods market in determining differences in real wage cyclicality across 
countries.
7 
In contrast to the differences across deflators, other dimensions in the data and methods have 
a much smaller impact on the distribution of real wage cyclicality measures. The forecast horizon or 
frequency window does not seem to vary across the different dimensions we study. The KS test fail 
to reject the null of equality of short and medium run distributions (p-value: 0.717) and medium vs. 
long run distributions (p-value: 0.998). Similarly, the choice of the cycle measure (employment vs. 
IP) has little effects on the measurement of cyclicality (p-value of KS test: 0.352).  The distribution 
of correlations generated using the frequency domain method is somewhat more peaked around zero 
                                                 
7 These results may also relate to the impact of different compositional effects across sectors on price inflation. First, it 
seems reasonable to expect a closer relationship between producer price inflation and business cycle measures that are 
specific to the manufacturing sector, than inflation in the economy as a whole. In particular, overall CPI is likely to 
reflect also fluctuations at the business cycle frequency that are specific to the services sector. Second, lower cyclicality 
of consumer prices is also in line with empirical evidence that consumer prices are adjusted somewhat less frequently 
than producer prices, possibly in part because of the higher labour intensity in the services sector (see Alvarez et al. 
2006).  
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than the distribution of measures from the time-domain methodology. This difference in distributions 
is confirmed to be statistically significant by the KS test (p-value: 0.003).  
Regression analysis allows us to go a step further and test for the impact of differences across 
data and methods by taking into account measurement uncertainty in the construction of real wage 
cyclicality measures. Moreover, it also allows us to determine whether differences across countries 
are statistically significant once differences in data and methods are controlled for. We perform our 
regression analysis by pooling our Fisher transformed estimates of wage cyclicality and estimate 
different specifications following the general model:  
w X c + = β             ( 4 )  
where  X is a (T  x K ) matrix of exogenous variables including indicator variables for data 
characteristics, methods and countries, c is a (T x 1) vector of estimates of real wage cyclicality 
pooling countries along the four dimensions of real wage cyclicality of our data, and w is a (T x 1) 
vector of stochastic elements that meets all the usual Gauss-Markov assumptions. A problem arises 
when estimating equation (4), since c is not observed. Instead we observe an unbiased estimatec ˆ, 
such that  u c c + = ˆ  and u  is a vector of sampling errors from the first stage dynamic estimation 
techniques. The problem is such that even if  ( ) I ww
2 ' σ = Ε  the error covariance for this second stage 
regression will not be homoskedastic, and hence OLS estimates will be inefficient. Hanushek (1974) 
shows that, under certain regularity conditions, the variance of the first stage estimates provides 
sufficient information to construct Feasible General Least Squares estimates of the second stage 
parameters that are asymptotically efficient. Accordingly, the standard errors of the estimates we 
report below are adjusted to take into account the measurement uncertainty associated with the 
dependent variable.  
Table 2 shows the regression results following expression 4. It should be noted that, after 
running the regressions with the z-Fisher transformed coefficients, we undo the transformation to  
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present in the Tables standard correlation coefficients and summary measures of wage cyclicality. 
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Since this transformation is not linear we approximate the standard errors of the coefficients 
using the delta method. The regression analysis confirms that among the four dimensions of our 
measures of cyclicality, the type of deflators used result in by far the largest statistically significant 
differences. In particular, real wage cyclicality is significantly more negative (more countercyclical) 
when measured using the PPI deflator, as opposed to the other deflators. In addition, in three out of 
four regressions the results show that the time domain method produces somewhat more 
countercyclical results than the frequency domain method. When country dummies are not included, 
other dimensions are also weakly statistically significant (see columns 1 and 3). However, these 
results are not robust to the inclusion of country dummies in the regression (see columns 2 and 4). 
The country dummies (not shown in the Table) are always jointly significant, even after controlling 
for differences across data and methods. We also ran regressions with interaction terms between the 
data and method dummies and found that they were in all cases not statistically significant (see 
columns 3 and 4). Therefore we drop them in the subsequent analysis.  
The country dummies from column (2) in Table 2 are shown in the first column of Table 3. 
Most country dummies are large compared to the direct effects of data and methods shown above 
and highly statistically significant. In order to complete the test for the influence of data and methods 
on differences across countries in measured real wage cyclicality, we sequentially add interaction 
effects between the set of country dummies and the four different data and methods dimensions. 
These regressions are shown in columns (2) to (5) of Table 3.  The results show that differences in 
the business cycle horizon can be ignored as a determinant of measured real wage cyclicality (see 
column 2). Most of the real wage adjustment appears to take place within the first year and a half of  
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the initial business cycle impulse. This fact, together with the relatively mild responses of wages to 
the business cycle even at longer-term business cycle frequencies suggests substantial stickiness in 
the wage setting process across the board. Regarding the measure of the business cycle, we find that 
the interactions between the IP dummy and country effects are jointly statistically significant (see 
column 4). This contrasts with the non-significant average effect of the business cycle dummy 
obtained in Table 2, suggesting that in some countries measured real wage cyclicality is higher when 
industrial production rather than employment is used as the measure of the business cycle, while the 
opposite occurs in other countries. Both effects seem to compensate each other when we average 
across countries. Confirming previous results, the interactions with the dummies for the different 
deflators are also highly significant (see column 5).  
We conclude that as regards the impact of data and methods, the methodology used, the 
deflator and the measure of the business cycle do matter for understanding measured real wage 
cyclicality. However, the only sizeable effect that is consistent across countries relates to the 
different deflators. In particular, when the dummy variables for the business cycle measure and the 
type of methodology are separately interacted with country dummies (columns 3 and 4), the country 
effects are very similar to our benchmark estimates when such interactions are excluded (column 1) 
and we fail to find a systematic pattern across countries along these different dimensions.
8 Instead, 
when the dummy variables for PPI and GDP deflators are interacted with country dummies (column 
5) the country effects differ significantly from the benchmark case. In particular, and with the 
exception of New Zealand, summary country measures of CPI wages (column 5) are more pro-
                                                 
8  Note that the dummy variable for the business cycle measure takes the value of 1 when industrial production is used to 
measure the business cycle. Therefore, the country main effects in column 4 can be interpreted as summary measures of 
real wage cyclicality using employment as the measure of the business cycle. Similarly the dummy for method takes the 
value 1 when the time domain based method is used, and therefore the country main effects in column 3 refer to real 
wage cyclicality using the frequency domain based method.   
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cyclical than the country effects obtained when averaging across the three deflators (column 1), 
although differences for some particular countries are not statistically significant at standard levels of 
significance. Finally, note that even after data and method differences are controlled for, country 
differences remain important and statistically significant.  
We turn next to investigate these country differences. We do this by constructing summary 
measures of real wage cyclicality for each country controlling for the impact of data and methods. 
We argue that looking at differences across different definitions of the real wage is economically 
meaningful. Since the results of our statistical analysis also suggest that differences across deflators 
are important, we separate the analysis of country effects between measures GDP, CPI and PPI 
deflated wages. In order to construct our summary indicators we run regressions following equation 
(4), controlling for the characteristics of the cyclicality measures for the three different sub-samples 
depending on the deflator. The summary country measures correspond to the coefficient of the 
country dummies in each of these regressions, where the constant term is excluded. 
Figure 4 presents our three summary measures of real wage cyclicality using the different 
deflators. The difference between the cyclicality of consumer real wages (pro-cyclical in most 
countries) and producer real wages (counter-cyclical in most countries) is noticeable. Furthermore, 
the cyclicality of real wages measured using the GDP deflators is somewhere in between that of the 
consumer and producer wages, but closer to the former. The rank correlation between the cyclicality 
of consumer real wages and real wages deflated by the GDP deflator is substantially larger (0.88), 
than the equivalent correlation between cyclicality of consumer and producer real wages (0.38). As 
regards the country ranking, Germany and Japan are the only two countries that exhibit consistently 
pro-cyclical real wages over the business cycle irrespective of the deflators used. Real wages are also 
mainly pro-cyclical in the United Kingdom and the Unites States. At the other extreme, Ireland, 
Spain, Canada and New Zealand exhibit consistently counter-cyclical behaviour of real wages  
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irrespective of the deflators used.
9 For some countries, such as France and Sweden, real wage 
cyclicality changes sign from pro-cyclical to counter-cyclical when moving from consumer to 
producer wages. This sign switch suggests that price mark-ups at the wholesale and retail levels have 
been more countercyclical in these countries.  
Differences in real wage cyclicality across countries could reflect different prevalence of 
supply versus demand shocks over time. In particular, when wages are not fully flexible over the 
business cycle, pro-cyclicality of real wages could be the outcome of price declines (increases) as a 
result of dominant positive (negative) aggregate supply shocks. Counter-cyclicality of real wages 
could in turn reflect price changes in response to dominant demand shocks. Indeed, there is some 
empirical evidence that the type of shocks matters for the cyclicality of real wages. For example, 
Fleischman (1999) finds that real wages in the US tend to be counter-cyclical in response to labour 
supply and aggregate demand shocks, and pro-cyclical in responses to productivity and oil shocks. 
However, as average real wage cyclicality is here measured over an extended time period, the impact 
of different types of shocks is likely to be less important. Instead, we speculate that differences in 
real wage cyclicality across countries have more to do with diversity in institutional frameworks 
governing labour markets in the countries in our sample. In particular, differences in real wage 
cyclicality across countries are more likely to reflect differences in the labour market response to 
common shocks owing to differences in institutions. 
To evaluate this dimension and to establish robustness of our results to differences in the 
composition of shocks over time, we have redone all of the analyses in the paper using a shorter 
sample, restricting the time period for all countries to begin from 1980. While in some cases the 
                                                 
9 An analysis of the cyclicality of nominal wages (not presented here for the sake of brevity) confirms that these results 
are driven by countercyclical nominal wages in these countries.  
18
results for the 1980s onwards sample point to somewhat less pro-cyclical real wages, overall, the 
results are not substantially different from those for the whole sample.  
5.  Interpretation of the results 
Cluster analysis of all the measures of real wage cyclicality is useful in further uncovering the 
underlying cross-country patterns in the different types of real wage cyclicality observed above.  The 
algorithm underlying cluster analysis searches sequentially for the most similar pairs of countries in 
terms of real wage cyclicality. We focus here on hierarchical clustering, following the criteria 
proposed by Ward to construct clusters of countries.
10 Cluster analysis is performed on our sample of 
648 measures of real wage cyclicality. The results are presented in terms of a tree diagram, where the 
height between clusters represents the dissimilarity between them.  
The results indicate that the countries can be divided into three main groups (see Figure 5).
11 
These groups of countries can be characterised as countries with mainly pro-cyclical real wages 
(Germany, Japan, the UK and the US), countries with mainly countercyclical real wages (Ireland, 
Spain, Canada and New Zealand) and the rest of the world “RoW” with very different patterns of 
cyclicality. These results indicate a more complex grouping of countries than suggested by a 
standard categorisation of countries to Continental European (sometimes further divided into Core 
and Mediterranean types), Anglo-Saxon and Nordic labour market types would suggest (see Sapir, 
2006 and OECD, 2008). In addition, Germany, a continental European country with relatively strong 
unions and rigid labour market structures, is grouped together with Anglo-Saxon countries such as 
the UK and the US that have weaker unions and are usually considered more flexible. The consistent 
                                                 
10 Other criteria such as agglomerative complete, weighted and average linkage produced similar results.  
11 There is no definitive test on the optimal number of clusters. However, the Calinski and Harabasz pseudo-F index and 
the Duda and Hart Je(2)/Je(1) test (not shown in the paper) support the existence of three clusters, as visual inspection of 
the tree diagram seem to suggest.  
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pro-cyclicality of real wages in Germany, the UK and US is, however, in line with microeconomic 
evidence presented in Peng and Siebert (2007). The Anglo-Saxon group itself is strongly divided in 
terms of the extent of measured real wage cyclicality to countries with pro or counter-cyclical real 
wages. The RoW could be further divided into at least two groups, where one cluster is formed by 
countries with largely a-cyclical real wages (including most Nordic countries with relatively strong 
labour unions, centralized bargaining and compressed wage structures) and those that exhibit pro-
cyclical consumer wages but counter-cyclical producer wages (including other large Continental 
European countries, such as France, Italy and the Netherlands with strong unionization but less 
centralized bargaining and stronger employment protection legislation).       
We have also evaluated the relationship between the different summary measures of wage 
cyclicality and key structural features and labour market institutions. Since we are going to be 
studying the role of labour market institutions and policies that might influence jointly the cyclicality 
of employment and wages, in the remainder of the paper we use a new set of summary measures of 
wage cyclicality where we exclude employment as an indicator of the cycle. This helps us in 
isolating the impact of each institution on the determination of wages. 
An important indicator that helps to explain the country clustering that we previously 
highlighted is trade orientation. The graphs on the left hand side of Figure 6 show the association 
between producer and consumer wages and the average import penetration in the goods sector of 
each country during the sample period.
12 The countries grouped under the heading “mainly 
procyclical wages” (marked with a diamond) tend to show very low values of import penetration in 
the goods sector. The opposite is true for countries with strongly counter-cyclical wages. The 
                                                 
12 See the Appendix for a definition of the variables used in the text. For the sake of clarity of exposition we exclude 
GDP deflated wages from the figure, since the follow pretty closely consumer wages and results for both variables are 
very similar. Very similar results, available upon request, are obtained with other indicators of trade openness such as the 
import penetration of goods and services, or total external trade as a share of GDP.  
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negative association between trade openness measured by import penetration and wage cyclicality is 
very similar in the cases of producer wages (correlation coefficient: -0.49; p-value: 0.04) and 
consumer wages (corr.: -0.46; p-value: 0.06). The graphs on the right show the correlation between 
wage cyclicality and a different measure of trade openness based on policies towards free trade. The 
picture is broadly consistent with that observed for trade openness, although the correlations are 
somewhat weaker (-0.36 and -0.35 for producer and consumer wages, respectively). This negative 
association between openness and wage cyclicality is supportive of the theoretical predictions in 
Aizenman (1985), who shows that wage indexation and hence real wage rigidity is more likely to 
arise in more open economies.  
Is the aggregate cyclicality of real wages related to measures of real wage rigidity? It is not 
easy to find systematic cross-country measures of wage rigidity to compare with our estimates. The 
International Wage Flexibility Project has recently measured real wage rigidity at the individual 
rather than aggregate level in several OECD countries. We therefore compare our results with those 
in Dickens et al. (2008) and find evidence of a negative correlation between their measure of 
downward real wage rigidity and our summary measures of real wage cyclicality. The correlation is 
strongest for the cyclicality of GDP deflated wages at -0.50 (with a p-value of 0.06 for 14 countries), 
suggesting that countries with more rigidities in real wages at the individual level are less like to 
have pro-cyclical and more likely to have counter-cyclical real wages at the aggregate level. While 
this evidence is only tentative, we would not expect a perfect correlation between the two set of 
measures as they relate to different samples (e.g. in terms of sectors and time periods covered) and, 
more importantly, to fundamentally different (although related) concepts. 
The counter-cyclicality of wages observed in many European countries in our sample can be 
rationalized by wage bargaining models (e.g. McDonald and Solow, 1981), where the insensitivity of 
real wages to shocks naturally leads to counter-cyclical movements of real wages. Indirectly, 
unionisation may also lead to more segmentation in the labour market, thus increasing the share of  
21
workers whose wages are insulated from changes in macroeconomic conditions (see Bertola, Blau 
and Kahn, 2007). We have explored the role of unionization in Figure 7. We use two different 
indicators of union bargaining power: the extent of union coverage and an index of legal strikes. 
Depending on the set of norms and regulations governing the labour market, there are large 
differences within countries between the coverage of wages negotiated by unions and the extent of 
unionisation (as measured by the number of union members in the total labour force).
13 For this 
reason, the indicator of union coverage is a better indicator than union density for evaluating the 
impact of unions in wage negotiations across countries. The index of legal strikes, obtained from 
Botero et al. (2004), measures the legal framework ruling strike rights and ranges from 0 to 1, 
increasing with the ease of organising legal strikes. We expect higher union bargaining power in 
those countries with generous strike legislation. Our measures of consumer and producer wages are 
negatively correlated with both measures of union bargaining power. The correlation is always 
significant at the 5% level in the case of producer wages (corr: -0.49 with union coverage and corr: -
0.46 with the index of legal strikes) but only significant in the case of consumer wages when the 
indicator of unionization is legal strikes (corr: -0.60, p-value less than 0.01). Hence, our results 
suggest that wages tend to be less pro-cyclical (more counter-cyclical) in countries with stronger 
union bargaining power. 
The results presented above are indicative of a negative association between unionization or 
trade openness and the cyclicality of wages. We have also explored the relationship between our 
measures of wage cyclicality with other institutional variables typically considered in cross-country 
studies of the determinants of employment or unemployment, such as the generosity and duration of 
unemployment benefits, the stringency of employment protection legislation, the extent of 
                                                 
13 Well-known examples are those of France and Spain where collective agreements cover more than three quarters of the 
labour force but less than 15 per cent of workers belong to a union.  
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coordination in wage setting and the degree of product market regulations.
14 In all cases we failed to 
find a statistically significant correlation. We speculate that this result may reflect important non-
linearities and complementarities. For example, while centralisation and coordination in bargaining 
is expected to reduce the adjustment of real wages to business cycle conditions Calmfors and Driffill 
(1988) argue that this relationship may be non-linear and consequently impossible to detect within 
our handful of observations. Moreover, it is possible that labour market institutions are binding only 
when they operate in bundle with other policies. Again, this complementarity of institutions, which 
has been shown to be important for other macroeconomic outcomes (see e.g. Belot and Van Ours, 
2004), cannot be easily detected with a limited number of country observations. 
Our final exercise aims at shedding some light on the importance of complementarity by 
focussing on the relationship between cyclicality of real wages and cyclicality of employment. On 
the one hand, firm profit maximization suggests that if employment and hours worked can not be 
fully adjusted to shocks such as fluctuations in product demand (e.g. because of substantial 
adjustment costs), then wages per hour worked may need to adjust more within the firm. This implies 
that also at the aggregate level lower cyclicality of employment should increase the need for wages 
to adjust to macroeconomic conditions, thus leading to a negative association between the cyclicality 
of real wages and employment within countries. On the other hand, labour market institutions might 
complement each other and thus attenuate fluctuations in both wages and employment. For instance, 
the ability of employment protection policies to insure workers from labour market income risk 
(Bertola, 2004) would be seriously limited if wages were adjusted at will by firms. Bertola and 
Rogerson (1997) have argued this is the reason we observe strong unions and binding minimum 
wages limiting wage adjustments in countries with strong employment protection. Hence, bundles of 
                                                 
14 See Nickell et al. (2005) for a discussion of these indicators and their impact on unemployment in OECD countries.  
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policies might limit both employment and wage adjustment, leading to a positive association 
between employment and wage cyclicality across countries.   
To explore this dimension, we proceed to measure the cyclicality of employment following 
the same methodology used for wages. Hence, we derive measures of employment cyclicality in the 
time and frequency domain and at different business cycle horizons, with industrial production as the 
measure of the business cycle. We also construct a summary measure of the cyclicality of 
employment in each country using the regression approach that was used to construct summary 
measures of real wage cyclicality. As before, we drop from the analysis employment as an indicator 
of the cycle to construct measures of wage cyclicality in order to avoid a spurious correlation with 
our measures of employment cyclicality. 
Using these summary measures we find that the cyclicality of employment and real wages are 
positively associated (see Figure 8).
15 More (less) pro-cyclical consumer and producer wages appear 
to go hand in hand with more (less) pro-cyclical employment. Relating these results to the country 
clustering found in the previous section, countries with mainly pro-cyclical real wages (Germany, 
Japan, the UK and the US) also exhibit clearly pro-cyclical employment. Other country clusters show 
more diversity. In particular, countries with mainly counter-cyclical real wages (Ireland, Spain, 
Canada and New Zealand) exhibit different degrees of employment cyclicality. The positive 
association between the cyclicality of real wages and employment appears robust. Regressing the 
cyclicality of consumer wages on the cyclicality of employment, we find that the coefficient on the 
cyclicality of employment is positive and statistically significant after controlling for data and 
method dummies (see Column 2 in Table 4). The coefficient of employment cyclicality remains 
positive and statistically significant also after adding cluster dummies (see Column 3 in Table 4) 
suggesting that the positive association between employment and wage cyclicality holds within 
                                                 
15 Again, the results based on a shorter sample from the 1980s onwards are not substantially different.  
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clusters. We also obtain mainly positive estimates in the case of producer wages (except for column 
6 when we control for clusters of countries), although the coefficients are not significant at standard 
levels. Overall, our findings provide some support to the hypothesis of complementarity of 
institutions simultaneously limiting employment and wage fluctuations.
16  
6.  Summary 
Little is known about true cross-country variation in the adjustment of real wages over the 
business cycle and its potential determinants. This is partly due to the heterogeneity in data 
characteristics and methods used in the various investigations. In this paper, we have contributed to 
the existing empirical literature by providing consistent comparative evidence of aggregate real wage 
cyclicality in the manufacturing sector for a large sample of OECD countries. We find that data and 
methods indeed matter for observed real wage cyclicality. However, among the different dimensions 
that we test, only differences in the type of deflators used result in robust differences that are 
consistent across countries. In particular, real wage cyclicality is significantly more negative (more 
countercyclical) when measured using the PPI deflator, as opposed to the other deflators. This 
evidence is in line with the evidence summarised in Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995) and points to 
an important role of the mark-up between producer and consumer prices in determining real wage 
cyclicality. Other dimensions, including the horizon at which cyclicality is measured are either not 
statistically significant or do not show similar effects across countries.  
We find that country differences in real wage cyclicality remain important even after 
controlling for differences in data and methods. The evidence presented in this paper thus suggests 
                                                 
16 Note that country dummies are not included in this regression. Including country dummies would limit the variation 
that is available to explain the association between the cyclicality of real wages and employment to differences in data 
and methods. However, standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and allow for correlation of the summary 
measures of wage and employment cyclicality within countries.  
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that variation in existing estimates of real wage cyclicality is not only due to differences across data 
and methods used. Our summary measure of real wage cyclicality that is clean of differences in data 
and methods confirms that the cyclicality of real wages varies substantially across countries. We 
argue that this heterogeneity may reflect fundamental differences in the functioning of labour 
markets, rather than a different composition of demand and supply shocks. Summary measures and 
cluster analysis point to a possible grouping of the countries to three groups: countries with mainly 
pro-cyclical real wages, countries with mainly counter-cyclical real wages and countries with either 
a-cyclical real wages or with very different patterns of cyclicality depending on the definition of the 
wage variable. These results also indicate a more complex grouping of countries than a basic 
categorisation of countries to Continental European, Anglo-Saxon and Nordic labour market types 
would suggest. Two structural features, the extent of union bargaining power and the degree of trade 
openness help understanding these clusters. Our evidence suggests that more open economies and 
countries with stronger unions tend to have less pro-cyclical (or more counter-cyclical) wages. 
Finally, our evidence also points towards a positive association between real wage cyclicality and the 
cyclicality of employment, in line with the view that policy complementarities could play an 
important role in determining labour market outcomes.   
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Table 1. Dynamic properties of data 
 
Nominal GDP defl CPI defl PPI defl IP E GDP defl. CPI PPI
Standard deviation
Average 0.014 0.012 0.011 0.021 0.025 0.017 0.015 0.014 0.024
Minimum 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.009 0.019 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.016
Maximum 0.024 0.028 0.017 0.051 0.036 0.029 0.028 0.020 0.048
Autocorrelation (AR1)
Average 0.939 0.901 0.916 0.912 0.909 0.934 0.943 0.958 0.930
Minimum 0.856 0.805 0.882 0.837 0.875 0.906 0.898 0.941 0.903
Maximum 0.959 0.950 0.945 0.948 0.937 0.957 0.967 0.972 0.957
Hourly Wages Cycle indicators Deflators
 
Note: All variables are cycle components extracted from the original log series using a Baxter-King band-pass filter (1.5-8 year frequency). The 
summary statistics reflect averages, minima and maxima across countries in our sample. IP refers to industrial production and E to employment in 
manufacturing.   30
Table 2. Determinants of real wage cyclicality: effects of data and methods 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Medium Run  -0.047  0.011  -0.089  0.005 
 (2.25)*  (0.69)  (2.17)*  (0.13) 
Long Run  -0.046  0.013  -0.091  0.003 
 (2.19)*  (0.77)  (2.21)*  (0.09) 
Time Domain  -0.072  -0.035  -0.117  -0.045 
 (4.00)**  (2.58)**  (2.97)**  (1.36) 
Industrial Production  -0.069  -0.032  -0.081  -0.006 
 (3.87)**  (2.34)*  (2.09)*  (0.17) 
GDP Deflator  0.144  0.203  0.069  0.166 
 (7.03)**  (12.78)**  (1.67)  (4.62)** 
CPI Deflator  0.203  0.258  0.140  0.231 
 (10.06)**  (16.59)**  (3.47)**  (6.60)** 
Time Domain * Medium Run      0.050  0.013 
     (1.10)  (0.40) 
Time Domain * Long Run      0.048  0.012 
     (1.06)  (0.36) 
Industrial Prod. * GDP Defl.      0.068  0.026 
     (1.51)  (0.77) 
Industrial Prod. * CPI Defl.      0.036  -0.004 
     (0.80)  (0.13) 
Industrial Prod. * Time Domain      -0.020  -0.046 
     (0.53)  (1.68) 
Industrial Prod. * Medium Run      0.022  -0.016 
     (0.48)  (0.48) 
Industrial Prod. * Long Run      0.019  -0.019 
     (0.43)  (0.56) 
GDP Defl. * Medium Run      0.064  0.007 
     (1.18)  (0.18) 
GDP Defl. * Long Run      0.069  0.013 
     (1.28)  (0.31) 
CPI Defl. * Medium Run      0.075  0.017 
     (1.38)  (0.43) 
CPI Defl. * Long Run      0.084  0.026 
     (1.56)  (0.64) 
GDP Defl. * Time Domain      0.078  0.040 
     (1.72)  (1.21) 
CPI Defl. * Time Domain      0.068  0.035 
     (1.51)  (1.03) 
Country Effects  No  Yes**  No  Yes** 
Wald Test      1.81*  0.50 
Adjusted R
2 0.14  0.58  0.16  0.58 
Observations 648  648  648  648 
Note: The dependent variable is real wage cyclicality (mean: -0.0056; s.d.: 0.267). FGLS 
regressions accounting for heteroskedasticity due to uncertainty in first-stage estimates (see the 
text for details). Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. * and ** denote significance at the 
5% and 1%  level respectively.  
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Table 3: Determinants of real wage cyclicality: country effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Australia  -0.165 -0.123 -0.158 -0.192 -0.029 
 (4.96)**  (2.31)*  (3.81)**  (5.07)**  (0.63) 
Austria -0.110  -0.107  -0.137  -0.197  0.061 
 (3.39)**  (2.05)*  (3.41)**  (5.16)**  (0.84) 
Belgium  -0.182 -0.160 -0.216 -0.180 -0.071 
 (5.51)**  (3.03)**  (5.24)**  (4.55)**  (0.97) 
Canada  -0.403 -0.398 -0.380 -0.423 -0.296 
  (15.13)** (9.39)** (11.29)** (13.99)** (4.54)** 
Denmark  -0.207 -0.177 -0.182 -0.281 -0.207 
  (6.49)** (3.45)** (4.44)** (7.65)** (2.95)** 
Finland -0.097  -0.105  -0.132  -0.006  0.085 
 (3.02)**  (2.06)*  (3.28)**  (0.17)  (1.20) 
France -0.009  0.014  -0.020  0.115  0.231 
 (0.28)  (0.25)  (0.46)  (2.89)**  (3.29)** 
Germany  0.157 0.139 0.115 0.184 0.253 
  (4.98)** (2.76)** (2.85)** (5.13)** (3.76)** 
Ireland  -0.352 -0.345 -0.313 -0.251 -0.287 
  (12.33)**  (7.53)** (8.43)** (7.14)** (4.20)** 
Italy  -0.182 -0.179 -0.129 -0.122 -0.041 
 (5.73)**  (3.52)**  (3.20)**  (3.19)**  (0.57) 
Japan  0.139 0.083 0.094 0.019 0.300 
 (4.21)**  (1.58)  (2.19)*  (0.48)  (4.54)** 
Netherlands -0.143  -0.165  -0.148  -0.082  0.019 
 (4.30)**  (3.16)**  (3.52)**  (2.03)*  (0.26) 
New  Zealand  -0.308 -0.318 -0.211 -0.319 -0.435 
  (9.96)** (6.46)** (5.18)** (8.94)** (7.16)** 
Norway  -0.116 -0.128 -0.164 -0.007 -0.119 
 (3.63)**  (2.51)*  (4.19)**  (0.18)  (1.67) 
Spain  -0.367 -0.370 -0.340 -0.361 -0.325 
 (12.75)**  (8.10)**  (9.13)**  (10.49)**  (4.99)** 
Sweden -0.132  -0.140  -0.128  -0.185  0.067 
 (4.11)**  (2.76)**  (3.21)**  (5.08)**  (0.93) 
United Kingdom  0.056  0.071  0.034  -0.071  0.149 
 (1.68)  (1.36)  (0.83)  (1.73)  (2.09)* 
United States  0.081  0.072  0.067  -0.014  0.123 
  (2.49)*  (1.39) (1.64) (0.36) (1.73) 
Data and methods fixed effects  Yes**  Yes**  Yes**  Yes**  Yes** 
Interactions with country effects:           
•  Business cycle frequencies  No Yes No  No No 
•  Method  No No  Yes**  No No 
•  Cycle Measure  No No No  Yes**  No 
•  Deflators  No No No No  Yes** 
Observations  648 648 648 648 648 
Adjusted R
2  0.58 0.56 0.60 0.67 0.74 
Note: The dependent variable is real wage cyclicality (mean: -0.0056; s.d.: 0.267). FGLS 
regressions accounting for heteroskedasticity due to uncertainty in first-stage estimates (see the 
text for details). Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. * and ** denote significance at the 
5% and 1%  level respectively. Column 1 presents the country effects corresponding to the 
specification presented in Column 2 of Table 2. The baseline category (shown in the table) for 
the interaction with country effects in columns 2-5 is: short run (column 2), frequency domain 
(column 3), employment (column 4) and CPI deflator (column 5).   32
 
 
Table 4. Wage and employment cyclicality 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Consumer Wages  Producer Wages 
Employment  Cycle  0.437 0.443 0.336 0.183 0.193 -0.072 
  (2.74)*  (2.66)*  (3.78)**  (1.57) (1.58) (0.64) 
Medium  Run   -0.009  -0.005  -0.011  -0.002 
   (0.54)  (0.32)  (0.97)  (0.17) 
Long  Run   -0.010  -0.005  -0.019  -0.007 
   (0.52)  (0.29)  (1.31)  (0.46) 
Time  Domain   -0.065  -0.062  -0.079  -0.074 
   (1.21)  (1.19)  (1.94)  (1.95) 
Cluster  2     0.172     0.332 
     (2.57)*     (5.08)** 
Cluster  3     -0.371     -0.101 
     (11.42)**     (1.18) 
Observations  108 108 108 108 108 108 
Note: Standard errors are robust to any form of heteroskedasticity, and are allowed to be 
clustered within countries. Cluster 2: takes value 1 for countries with mostly pro-cyclical wages 
as suggested in the text. Cluster 3: takes value 1 for countries with mostly counter-cyclical 
wages as suggested in the text.   33
 
Figure 1: Selected measures of co-movement for Spain 
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B. Frequency domain method
 
Note: Dashed lines represent 90% confidence bands. Bootstrapped standard errors based on 
1000 replications were used to construct confidence bands and standard errors.   34
 
Figure 2: Selected measures of co-movement for the United States 
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Note: Dashed lines represent 90% confidence bands. Bootstrapped standard errors based on 
1000 replications were used to construct confidence bands and standard errors.  35
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Note: Each symbol corresponds to one of the country clusters identified in Figure 5. The ♦ 
represents countries with mainly pro-cyclical wages, ■ stands for countries with mainly counter-
cyclical wages and ● for the “RoW” cluster.   39
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Note: Each symbol corresponds to one of the country clusters identified in Figure 5. The ♦ 
represents countries with mainly pro-cyclical wages, ■ stands for countries with mainly counter-
cyclical wages and ● for the “RoW” cluster.   40































































































Note: Each symbol corresponds to one of the country clusters identified in Figure 5. The ♦ 
represents countries with mainly pro-cyclical wages, ■ stands for countries with mainly counter-
cyclical wages and ● for the “RoW” cluster. 
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Appendix 1: Sample coverage 








  Start End Start End Start End Start End Start End 
Australia 1983q4 2004q1 1983q4 2004q1 1983q4 2004q1 1976q3 2004q1 1960q1  2005q4 
Austria 1960q1 2003q4 1960q1 2003q4 1960q1 2003q4 1988q1 2004q1 1960q1  2005q4 
Belgium 1980q1 2004q1 1980q1 2004q1 1980q1 2004q1 1981q1 2003q2 1960q1  2005q4 
Canada 1961q1 2004q1 1960q1 2004q1 1960q1 2004q1 1960q1 2004q1 1961q1  2005q4 
Denmark 1977q1 2003q4 1971q1 2003q4 1974q1 2003q4 1977q1 2003q4 1977q1  2005q4 
Finland 1960q1 2004q1 1960q1 2004q1 1975q1 2004q1 1960q1 2004q1 1960q1  2005q4 
France 1963q1 2003q4 1960q1 2003q4 1960q1 2003q4 1970q1 2004q1 1963q1  2005q4 
Germany 1960q1 2004q1 1960q1 2004q1 1960q1 2004q1 1960q1 2004q1 1960q1  2005q4 
Ireland 1960q1 2003q4 1960q1 2003q4 1968q1 2003q4 1960q1 2003q4 1960q1  2005q4 
Italy 1960q1 2004q1 1960q1 2004q1 1981q1 2004q1 1970q1 2004q1 1960q1  2005q4 
Japan 1960q1 2004q1 1960q1 2004q1 1960q1 2004q1 1960q1 2004q1 1960q1  2005q4 
Netherlands 1970q1 2004q1 1970q1 2004q1 1971q1 2004q1 1987q1 2003q4 1960q1  2005q4 
New Zealand  1989q1 2004q1 1989q1 2004q1 1989q1 2004q1 1989q1 2004q1 1961q2  2005q4 
Norway 1960q1 2004q1 1960q1 2004q1 1977q1 2004q1 1972q1 2004q1 1960q1  2005q4 
Spain 1981q1 2003q4 1981q1 2003q4 1981q1 2003q4 1976q3 2004q1 1970q1  2005q4 
Sweden 1971q1 2004q1 1971q1 2004q1 1982q1 2004q1 1963q1 2004q1 1960q1  2005q4 
United Kingdom  1963q1 2004q1 1963q1 2004q1 1963q1 2004q1 1980q1 2003q4 1960q1  2005q4 
United States  1960q1 2004q1 1960q1 2004q1 1960q1 2004q1 1960q1 2004q1 1960q1  2005q4 
Note: The table reports for each country the available coverage for the series on real wages and indicators of the cycle. Instead of showing the 
coverage separately for nominal wages, GDP deflator, CPI deflator and PPI deflator, we show directly the coverage of the correspondent real wage 
series. The reason is that the real wage series are the object of the analysis. The source is the OECD Main Economic Indicators database.  
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Appendix 2: Description of institutional variables 
 
•  Import penetration is defined as the share of imported goods on total internal demand. 
Source: OECD ANA database. 
•  Trade openness policies are measured as the fraction of years from 1960 to 1998 that the 
country does not interfere with foreign trade, as compiled by Sachs and Warner (1995) measured 
on a (0, 1) scale. A country is considered open if it satisfies all of the following criteria: (1) 
nontariff barriers cover less than 40 percent of trade; (2) average tariff rates are less than 40 
percent; (3) the black market premium was less than 20 percent during the 1970s and 1980s; (4) 
the economy is not socialist; and (5) the government does not control major exports through 
marketing boards. 
•  Union coverage data for all countries with the exception of New Zealand, Spain and 
Ireland come from Golden and Wallerstein (2002). Coverage for New Zealand and Spain is 
reported in OECD (1997) and for Ireland in Holden and Wulfsberg (2008). 
•  Legal strikes is the average of three indicator variables: (1) Wildcat strikes are legal, (2) 
Political strikes are legal, (3) Sympathy / solidarity / secondary strikes are legal. Source: Botero 
et al. (2004). 